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Although global investors have been paying more heed than ever to 
Corporate Governance for the last decade, the evolving premium risk 
stemming  from  variegated  governance  issues  has  not  been  factored 
yet  into  the  expected  return  of  any  investor’s  portfolio.  From  a 
theoretical standpoint, this paper sets forth firstly a weighted-average 
index  built  up  by  choosing  distinctive  and  relevant  governance 
variables that go beyond provisions usually embedded in the founding 
charter.  Afterwards,  a  measure  of  governance  risk  premium  will  be 
derived out of the index rate of change. Lastly, it will be introduced a 
multiplicative model of expected returns with a risk adjustment factor 
over the risk-free asset comprising systematic, nonsystematic, country 
and governance risk premiums.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For the last three decades, a storm of criticism about corporate bad 
practices, as well as managers’ malfeasance, has been spreading all 
over  the  world
1.  Such  apprehensions  have  been  raised  from  many 
quarters,  mainly  from  the  side  of  lawmakers,  financial  institutions, 
stockholders, regulators, investment banks, bondholders, institutional 
investors, and gatekeepers. 
  
At  the  root  of  the  ongoing  discussion  is  the  extent  to  which  any 
company might be able to devise, carry out and conclusively exhibit 
good governance
2. The logic behind the above-mentioned concerns is 
predicated upon the following features:  
 
Good  corporate  governance  pays  off,  adds  market  value  to  the 
company,  builds  up  reliable  corporate  practices,  fosters  better 
accountability among stakeholders, sharpens up transparency as well 
as  more  responsive  covenants  on  behalf  of  creditors  and  other 
stakeholders.  
 
In the meantime, global institutions like the World Bank and the IMF 
have been designing indexes of governance not only for countries but 
also  for  single  companies  in  the  private  sector.  On  this  line  of 
research,  an  academic  contribution  has  been  provided  by  Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2001), which seems worthy of being outlined at this 
place:   
 
a) The authors chose 24 provisions regularly embedded in corporate 
charters,  mainly  related  to  takeover  defenses  and  shareholders 
rights. Next, they searched for distinguishable patterns of behavior 
in  those  provisions  along  time,  within  a  universe  of  about  1,500 
companies listed in the USA stock market. Their major finding was 
an impressively positive relationship between governance and stock 
returns. 
 
b) Each  provision  was  given  the  value  +1  whenever  shareholders’ 
rights were hampered by management entrenchment, and marked 
-1 otherwise. Companies clustered in the first decile of the sample 
qualified as members of the “management portfolio”, whereas those 
                                                            
1 It is for Appendix 2 to make explicit the underlying definition of governance taken 
for granted in this paper. On corporate bad practices and scandals, Enron is a case in 
point, which we have dealt with elsewhere (Apreda, 2002).  
2  A  thorough  discussion  of  corporate  governance  issues  is  to  be  found  in  Apreda 
(2007a, 2005a, 2006a, 2003b).   4 
in the last decile qualified like firms belonging to the “shareholders’ 
portfolio”. This choice of variables and values amounts to an ordinal 
index based on qualities rather than on weighted averages, as it is 
the case with cardinal indexes.  
 
c)  Higher values of the index were found in companies with a powerful 
management, whereas lower values gathered around firms placed 
in the shareholders’ portfolio. Therefore, this index intends to track 
down on the balance of power between shareholders and managers, 
against the background of pervading agency problems
3. 
      
In this paper, we intend to handle a distinctive problem that arises in 
Corporate Finance and Portfolio Management: how could big investors 
in capital markets discount governance risk from the expected return 
they claim from their investment? To attain our purposes we are going 
to  produce  a  cardinal  index  that  measures  up  changes  in  a  set  of 
governance variables not necessarily included in the founding charter.  
 
To start with, section 1 lays foundations for a weighted-average index 
of governance. Next, in section 2, the rate of change of the index will 
pave the way to a measure of governance risk premium. Lastly, it is 
for section 3 to factor the governance risk into a multiplicative model 
of expected returns.   
 
 
1.  A CARDINAL GOVERNANCE INDEX 
 
How could we appraise the extent of governance performance? Among 
other available alternatives, one course of action may consist in setting 
up an index. Such yardstick would provide us with a numerical variable 
that evolves as time passes by, and whose rate of change, period after 
period,  allows  us  to  keep  a  record  of  how  well  the  company  meets 
governance standards.   
   
So far, a variety of worldwide and well-known institutions have been 
developing  governance  indexes.  Among  such  index-builders,  we  can 
                                                            
3 In Appendix 2, we are going to handle an epistemological subject matter: how does 
an  index  become  consistent  with  certain  underlying  definition  of  Corporate 
Governance?     5 
point to the World Bank, the OECD, and risk-rating agencies
4. But in 
practice, most of such indexes have been “qualitative” (ordinals)
5. 
 
In contradistinction to the ordinal approach, we advocate at this place 
a  quantitative  approach.  Albeit  a  theoretical  viewpoint,  we  hope 
econometricians and practitioners find it suitable for their research and 
applications. Our index works on three broad assumptions: 
 
a) A cardinal governance index G(t) is available at date t. In fact, we 
are going to shape such an index in the following subsections. 
 
b) At date t, and within a planning horizon H = [t; T], we would also 
be able to assess the value of the index, Et [G(T)] expected for 
date T, a suitable valuation for practitioners and analysts.  
 
c)  The  index  allows  for  a  quantitatively  weighted  measure  of 
governance performance. Broadly speaking, the higher its value the 
better.    
 
The major points of this section are the following: firstly, we put up 
the  index;  secondly,  a  recursive  algorithm  brings  to  light  the  index 
dynamics;  next,  we  expand  on  suitable  governance  variables; 
afterwards,  we  move  on  the  weighting  system;  last  of  all,  we 
undertake a balanced assessment of the index.  
 
1.1   BUILDING UP THE INDEX 
 
Let  us  imagine  that  certain  organization,  which  we  have  called 
elsewhere  a  governance  broker
6,  agrees  that  the  subsequent  vector 
comprises explanatory variables for governance, at date t, 
  
G   =   [ G(1), G(2), … … … … , G(L) ] 
 
Moreover, the broker produces a weighting system, at date t, which 
arises from the vector 
 
W  =  [ w(1), w(2), w(3), … … … … , w(L) ] 
                                                            
4 References, at the end of this paper, provide the reader with web pages of some of 
these organizations. 
5 As it happens with the index produced by Gompers et al. (2001), which we have 
already discussed in the introduction.  
6  Apreda  (2007b).  To  name  but  a  few  examples  of  governance  brokers  we  could 
point  to investment  banks,  risk-rating  companies,  financial  consultants,  law  firms, 
research centers, capital-market analysts in stock exchanges.   6 
The index should be defined out of a universe of available companies, 
also framed as a vector 
 
G G G G   =  [  k1 ; k2 ; k3 ;  …… ks ] 
 
and to compute its vale at date t, for company k, we avail ourselves of 
the scalar product of vectors G and W: 
 
G(k; t) =  
 
= [G(k; 1; t), G(k; 2; t), … , G(k; L; t)] . [w(1), w(2), … , w(L)] 
 
that is to say, the index springs up from the dated expression: 
(1) 
G(k; t)  =   
 





G(k; t)  =   ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  w(i) . G(k; i; t)      ;   i: 1, 2, 3, … … , L 
 
Therefore,  for  each  organization  k,  and  at  any  date  t,  there  is  a 
structure of explanatory factors and relative weights as it is shown in 




G(k; 1; t)  G(k; 2; t)  … G(k; i; t) …  G(k; L; t) 
Weighting  
System 
W(1)  w(2)  … w(i) …  W(L) 
 
As we can see, governance variables do take specific values for each 




1.2  A RECURSIVE ALGORITHM FOR  
THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE INDEX 
 
Recalling (1’)   
                                                            
7 When writing down G(k; t) we mean the value of the index at date t for company 
k, whereas G(k; j; t) stands for the value of the governance variable G(j) at date t, 
for company k. 
8 The updating of weights will be developed in section 1.4.   7 
 
G(k; t)  =   ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  w(i) . G(k; i; t)    ;   i: 1, 2, 3, … … , L 
 




G(k; i; t)    = G(k; i; t – 1)  +  e e e e(k; i; t – 1; t) 
 
where 
        + 1  (compliance
10 level)  
if there is material evidence that the underlying 
variable  has  moved  for  the  better  over  the 
valuation period. 
 
e e e e(k; j; t – 1; t) =     0       (neutral level) 
if  there  is  no  conclusive  evidence  that  any 
material change has taken place.  
 
      - - - - 1  (non compliance level) 
if  there  is  material  evidence  that  the 
underlying  variable  has  moved  for  the  worse 
over the valuation period. 
 
Summing  up,  (2)  defines  each  governance  variable  inductively.  In 
other  words,  (2)  conveys  the  idea  of  an  accumulative  process  that 
holds  for  every  company  k.  As  time  goes  by,  the  process  rewards 
compliance and punishes non-compliance, period after period.  
 
1.3  ABOUT A SET OF GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
 
At  this  juncture,  we  have  to  render  account  of  our  choice  of 
governance variables. They are sorted out in Exhibit  1
11 under the 
headings of six broad categories, namely Board of Directors, Owners, 
Governance  Architecture,  Management,  Creditors,  Gatekeepers  and 
Regulators. It goes without saying that, in actual practice, the analyst 
or  econometrician  laboring  over  this  index  may  shorten  the  list  of 
                                                            
9 We assume that the variable “date at t” belongs to a denumerable set that stands 
for an index set. More background on recursive or inductive definitions can be found 
in Eccles (2004) or Block (2000). 
10  Compliance  risk  and  compliance  functions  are  newcomers  in  the  governance 
parlance, since their introduction by the Bank of Basel like guidelines for financial 
institutions  worldwide.  The  first  extension  of  both  notions  to  non-financial 
organizations was provided by Apreda (2007c). 
11 Further background on the semantics of the variables included in Exhibit 1 can be 
found in Apreda (2007a, 2007b, 2006a)   8 
variables on the grounds of tractability, relevance, research costs, or 






Board of Directors 
 
Independent Directors 
CEO and Chair as separate functions 
Control and fiduciary duties 
Audit Committee 
Staggering appointments 
Compliance risk committee 





Control and decision rights 
Tight-budget constraints 
Rent-seeking avoidance mechanisms 
Compensation packages  
Severance payments 
Anti-takeover provisions 





One share, one vote 
Differential voting rights 
Pyramids and cross-holdings structures 







Protective covenants in bonds and bank’s 
loans 
Financial hybrids and capital structure 
Banks influence in Boards 








Codes of Good Practices 
Reorganization provisions 
Design of accountability mechanisms 
Transparency procedures 
Private or public placements of securities 
 
Gatekeepers and regulators 
 
Federal or state incorporation rules 
Design of open or closed organizations 
Auditor independence 
Credit risk ratings 
Compliance risk 
Corporate or Private Companies Laws 
 
Exhibit 1 
Some corporate governance variables 
 
For  the  sake  of  illustration  about  how  to  use  a  governance  variable 
included in the exhibit, let us pick “independent directors”, from the 
set of variables related to the category “Board of Directors”. In this 
case, we would denote the variable as: 
 
G(k; i; t)  =  G(k; B1; t)   9 
where B1 stands for the statement “the first variable in the Board of 
Directors category” (see Exhibit 1). 
 
a)  At the starting date, when company k is rated for the first time, 
only  two  alternative  values  are  attainable  from  the  up-to-date 
information: 
 
              + 1 
G(k; B1; 0)  = 
- - - -  1  
 
 
If  the  founding  Charter  established  that  at  least  one  independent 
director ought to be appointed, + 1 would follow when B1 becomes 
true, and – 1 would be the mark given if B1 were disproved outright.  
 
A similar rating would have been ensued if the statement had been 
embedded in the Governance Statute, instead of being a provision in 
the  Charter.  Likewise,  if  it  had  been  compulsorily  settled  by  the 
regulator. 
   
b) As time passes by, let us assume that at date t1, for instance, the 
company increases the number of independent directors. Therefore: 
 
G(k; B1; t 1)    =   G(k; B1; t 1 – 1)  +  e e e e(k; B1; t 1 – 1; t 1  ) 
 
such that 
e e e e(k; B1; t 1 – 1; t 1  )  =  + 1 
 
Other  plausible  settings  from  which  the  chosen  governance  variable 
could deserve a mark of + 1 are the following: 
 
-  independent directors uphold their fiduciary duties in critical issues, 
like  those  involving  self-dealing,  soft-budget  constraints,  rent-




-  keeping  record  on  how  often  independent  directors  vote  for  or 
against decisions that could conflict with commitments over which 
they will be held accountable for eventually.  
 
                                                            
12 These topics are enlarged in Apreda (2004, 2007a, 2006a).    10 
At the opposite extreme, let us imagine that the company reduces the 
number  of  independent  directors  or,  making  things  worse,  it 
suppresses their appointment to the Board. In that case,  
 
e e e e(k; B1; t 1 – 1; t 1  )  =  – 1 
 
By the same token, and among other examples that lead to the – 1 
mark we can single out the following: 
 
-  likely malfeasance of independent directors;  
 
-  Board  independence  and  their  control  rights  are  disregarded  by 
management or blockholders; 
 
-  self-dealing and soft-budget constraints are neither monitored nor 
forestalled by independent directors; 
 
-  fiduciary duties are not fulfilled. 
 
 
1.4  ABOUT THE WEIGHTING SYSTEM 
 
Starting  from  the  universe  of  available  companies,  conveyed  by  the 
vector  
G G G G=  [ [ [ [  k1 ; k2 ; k3 ;  …… ks ] ] ] ] 
 
and taking into account the vector of governance variables  
 
G   =   [ G(1), G(2), … … … … , G(L) ] 
 
we  can  define  a  sample  space  suitable  for  our  purposes  as  the 
cartesian product 
 
G ´ ´ ´ ´ G G G G   = { { { {  ( G(i) ; k j )  ½ ½ ½ ½ i : 1, 2, … , L  ;  j : 1, 2, … , s  } } } } 
 
Afterwards,  we  define  a  boolean-valuation  function,  Bool,  from  the 
cartesian G ´ ´ ´ ´ G G G G on the set  
 
{ { { {  (a i 
j ) L ´ ´ ´ ´ S   ½ ½ ½ ½ i : 1, 2, … , L  ;  j : 1, 2, … , s } } } } 
 
of all real matrix of L files by S columns, in the following way: 
 
Bool  :    G ´ ´ ´ ´ G G G G     ® ® ® ®     (a i 
j ) L ´ ´ ´ ´ S   11 
such that 
Bool [ ( G(i) ; k j ) ]     =  ( d d d d i 





1  if company j is responsive to  
variable i 
d d d d i 
j   =   
   
0  if  company  j  is  non-responsive 
to variable i 
 
Hence, from the sample space stems a matrix of coefficients, whose 
files stand for governance variables, and columns for companies, as 
shown below.  
 
   
d 1
1   d 1
2    d 1




1   d 2
2    d 2




1   d 3
2    d 3
3    ….…… d 3 
s 
( d d d d i  
j  ) L ´ ´ ´ ´ S  = 
      ……………    …………. 
      …………..    …………. 
 
d L
1   d L
2   d L




Being responsive for the company j to the variable i, means at least 
three things: 
 
a) the  variable  becomes  related  to  the  company’s  governance  in  a 
distinctive way; 
 
b) we can ascertain whether the company is performing well or badly, 
regarding that variable; 
 
c)  if the company j is unrelated to certain variable i, then there is no 
responsiveness and d d d d i 
j  is zero. 
 
                                                            
13 That is to say, the matrix is boolean and its coefficientes are Kronecker’s deltas. 
   12 
Looking up in Exhibit 1 again, let us take from the category Board of 
Directors,  the  variable  “Audit  Committee”.  To  be  responsive  or  not 
would mean that the company, for instance: 
 
￿  it has an Audit Committee, either as a regulatory constraint, or as 
an outcome of its own discretionary governance; 
 
￿  it enhances the committee by appointing independent directors; 
 
￿  it reports no such committee on the grounds of its organizational 
nature, a feature often found in some cooperatives, certain kinds of 
foundations and mutuals, and most of medium and small family-
owned companies.  
 
We are going to take advantage of this matrix to set up the weighting 
system, by means of the cardinal number for the following finite set
14: 
 
# # # # { { { {File ( h ) } } } }  =   # # # # { { { {  d h  
j  = 1  ;   j: 1, 2, … , S } } } }  
 
that is to say, we count the number of non-zero elements in such file.  
 
Lastly,  we  reckon  each  weight,  for  any  governance  variable  h,  by 
solving 
  
w(i)   =  # # # # { { { { File ( i ) } } } }  /  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ # # # # { { { { File ( h ) } } } };     i: 1, 2,  …  , L 
 
THE UPDATING ISSUE 
 
As it usually happens with averaged indexes, the vector of weights is 
to  be  chosen  at  some  conventional  starting  date,  and  it  goes 
unchanged unless there are material evidence that some weights, at 
least, have to be updated eventually
15.   
 
There  are,  however,  two  settings  from  which  an  updating  decision 
turns out to be of necessity:  
 
                                                            
14 For ease of notation, we follow the widely used symbol # {A}, that stands for “the 
cardinal number of the set A”, where A is a finite set. Bloch (2000) or Eccles (2004) 
enlarge upon this subject matter by means of a basic and readable framework of 
analysis.   
15 By the way, this is the usual updating process that well-known indexes undergo 
now  and  then,  like  the  SP500  (New  York),  FT100  (London),  Bovespa  (Brazil)  or 
Merval (Argentina).    13 
a)  this  could  be  the  case,  for  instance,  when  we  find  out  that,  for 
certain company k j, at date t, there is a new governance variable  
 
G(k j ; i; t ) 
 
for  which  the  company  starts  to  be  responsive;  hence,  there  is  a 
positive  change  in  # # # #{ { { {File  (i)} } } }.  On  the  opposite  side,  the  company 
stops being responsive to the governance variable, bringing about a 
decrease in # # # #{ { { {File (i)} } } }. An example for the former setting could be 
when  a  company  decides  to  have  independent  directors,  while  the 
latter setting would be illustrated when the company gets rid of the 
rule “one-share, one vote” (see Exhibit 1).  
 
b)  another  needful  situation  for  updating  changes  hinges  upon  new 
companies gaining either entrance into the starting universe  
 
G G G G=  [ [ [ [  k1 ; k2 ; k3 ;  …… ks ] ] ] ] 
 
or  exit  from  such  universe,  as  it  happens  with  older  and  failing 
companies. 
 
1.5  ASSESSMENT 
 
Our weighted average index exhibits some noticeable features: 
 
￿  It  encompasses  relevant  governance  variables,  most  of  them  not 
embodied like provisions in the founding charter. 
 
￿  The  recursive  process  depicted  in  (3)  accounts  for  increases  or 
decreases of the variable’s performance along time. 
 
￿  In contradistinction to Gompers’ index, which is framed out of open 
companies  listed  in  stocks,  our  index  also  pertains  to  closed  and 
family-owned companies, which are so widespread in governances 
around the world not fitting into the Anglo-Saxon paradigm. 
 
￿  Being a blend of governance variables, not all of them included as 
provisions  in  the  charter,  the  index  also  comprises  regulatory 
governance  prescriptions,  discretionary  decision-making  and 
choices subsumed under the company’s bylaws or its Governance 
Statute, as well as institutional constraints
16. 
                                                            
16 Mark Roe (2003) furnishes with an impressive empirical and theoretical rationale 
about several key issues in Comparative Governance. A comprehensive analysis of   14 
￿  Last of all, as we are going to develop in next section, the rate of 
change of our index surveys governance performance, while their 
discount  counterpart  will  factor  a  measure  of  governance  risk 
premium into the investor’s expected return. 
 
 
2. THE RATE OF GOVERNANCE AND THE  
MEASURE OF GOVERNANCE-RISK 
 
Let  
r k (governance) 
 
be the rate of change that will gauge the company k ’s performance on 
governance issues, which comes defined as: 
(4) 
1 +  r k (governance)   =   G(k; T) / G(k; t) 
 
If this rate attained a positive value, governance would be improving 
on the whole, but if negative it would stand to signal that corporate 
governance is worsening (see Exhibit 2). As we need a rate of change 
to adjust the governance risk of the underlying financial asset, the rate 
r k (governance) in (4) must contribute to shape a discount rate  
 
D D D D govrisk k 
 
but  this  is  easily  attained  by  means  of  a  basic  theorem  in  financial 
mathematics stating that for any ex post rate of change of a financial 
variable,  there  exists  an  ex  ante  rate  of  discount  that  matches  the 
former
17, so that it holds: 
(5) 
< 1 +  r k ( governance) > . < 1 – D D D D govrisk k>  =  1 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Charter Compact as the mainstay of Corporate Governance has recently been 
carried out by Apreda (2007d). 
17 Cutting down to essentials: in the context of financial mathematics, the theorem 
holds that  
 
( 1 + i ) . ( 1 – d )  =  1 
 
which stands for the statement “the final value of a unitary capital, that is (1 + i), 
when discounted by the rate d, attains a present value of (1 – d).” The enlargement 
to rates of change in financial or economic variables is derived outright. On the other 
hand,  it  is  a  well-known  mechanism  for  arbitraging  rates  of  interest  in  money 
markets.  It can also be expanded to carry out arbitrage of financial assets in the 
capital  markets,  and  also  in  foreign  exchange  transactions  [on  foundations  and 


















































GOVERNANCE  INDEX 
 




RATE OF CHANGE OF THE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
 
1 +  r k ( governance)   =   G( k, T ) / G( k, t ) 
 
 
RATE OF GOVERNANCE RISK 
 
From     < 1 +  r k ( governance) > . < 1 - - - - D D D D govrisk k >  =  1 
 
we get 
     r k ( governance) 
D D D D govrisk k   = 
< 1 +  r k ( governance) >  
 
 
EXPECTED RETURN OF A FINANCIAL ASSET 
 
ADJUSTED BY GOVERNANCE RISK 
 
 
1  +  E[ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ]   =   < 1 + D D D D risk-free > . < 1 + D D D D counrisk > .  
 
. < 1 + D D D D sysrisk k > . < 1 + D D D D nonsysrisk k > . < 1 - - - - D D D D govrisk k > 
 
GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE SYSTEM 
 
 
·  GOVERNANCE EXPLAINING FACTORS 
 
·  WEIGHTS FOR THE GOVERNANCE FACTORS   16 
The value of the rate of discount comes out from the equation above 
and leads to: 
(6) 
 
r k ( governance) 
D D D D govrisk k    = 
< 1 +  r k ( governance) >  
 
Which is the role that the discount factor  
 
< 1 – D D D D govrisk k> 
 
will play when all is said and done? To answer such question, we must 
move  on  to  the  expected  return  of  a  financial  asset,  or  a  portfolio 
consisting of financial assets. 
 
 
3.   A MULTIPLICATIVE MODEL FOR THE EXPECTED 
RETURN OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND PORTFOLIOS 
 
Let us appraise the minimal expected rate of return E[ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ] an investor 
may claim for certain financial asset Ak, issued by any organization in 
the  private  sector
18.  We  are  going  to  stress  that  such  return  stems 
from five variables, or explanatory factors:  
 
D D D D risk-free    expected return from an USA risk-free asset
19; 
 
D D D D counrisk    expected  rate  of  change  for  a  suitable  measure  of 
country risk; 
 
D D D D sysrisk k  expected  rate  of  change  for  systemic  risk  for 
company k; 
 
D D D D nonsysrisk k  expected  rate  of  change  for  non  systemic  risk  for 
company k; 
 
D D D D govrisk k  expected  rate  of  change  in  the  governance  of  the 
institution.  
 
                                                            
18 It goes without saying that our analysis holds also true on portfolios of financial 
assets (see Apreda, 2005a).  
19  Further  details  on  this  choice  of  risk-free  assets  can  be  found  in  Damodaran 
(2001, 1999).   17 
Formally, we are going to factor these variables into the expected rate 




1  +  E[ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ]   =   < 1 + D D D D risk-free > . < 1 + D D D D counrisk > .  
 
. < 1 + D D D D sysrisk k > . < 1 + D D D D nonsysrisk k > . < 1 - - - - D D D D govrisk k > 
 
Notice that over the flat risk-free rate level, we actually embrace a risk 
adjustment or (risk premium) that comes explained by the composite: 
 
(8) 
Risk Adjustment  =   < 1 + D D D D counrisk > .  < 1 + D D D D sysrisk k > .  
 
.  < 1 + D D D D nonsysrisk k > . < 1 - - - - D D D D govrisk k > 
 
We leave for Appendix 1 a more analytical approach to handling (7) 




Firstly, we must realize that variables 
 
D D D D counrisk ;  D D D D sysrisk k ;  D D D D nonsysrisk k  
 
may marginally increase the risk adjustment depicted by (8), any time 
each of them signals that a positive increment took place. 
  
Secondly,  
D D D D govrisk k 
 
entails a contrarian behavior.  
 
When the rate of governance rk (governance) raises, then the value 
of  D D D D  govrisk  k  increases  but,  being  a  discount  rate,  it  takes  value 
away  from  the  risk  adjustment
21.  That  is  to  say,  good  governance 
lessens the contribution of the discount factor to the risk adjustment in 
                                                            
20 In this section we take advantage of a comprehensive analysis rendered in my 
book, Differential Rates, Residual Information Sets, and Transactional Algebras, Nova 
Science  Publisher,  New  York,  2005.  Background  on  additive  and  multiplicative 
models, as well as their linkage can be found in Apreda (2005a, 2006b).  
21 This can also be regarded, from a marginal standpoint, as a negative contribution 
to risk adjustment.   18 
(8). That is why the rate D D D D govrisk k turns out to be a proxy for risk-
premium. 
 
Thirdly, if governance worsens, by a similar argument, we can state 
that rk (governance) becomes negative (it decreases the value of the 
index),  and  D D D D  govrisk  k  also  turns  out  negative,  being  the  final 
outcome that  
1 –  D D D D govrisk k    >  1 
 
hence the discount factor makes a positive and marginal contribution 
to  risk  adjustment  as  the  company  k  becomes  riskier  due  to 
underperforming governance. 
  
From this point of view, D D D D govrisk  k partakes of the same nature of 
the  country  risk  measure:  both  stand  for  certain  number  of  basis 
points to reward the investor for his risky choice. In the first case, by 
diminishing the risk premium whenever the governance proves to be 
good,  in  the  second  one  to  increase  the  risk  premium  when  the 





This  paper  has  put  forth  a  weighted-average  index  whose  rate  of 
change  measures  governance  performance.  The  variables  of 
governance  have  been  chosen  out  of  relevance.  It  is  not  a  minor 
feature that most of them do not stem from enabling provisions in the 
charter  but  from  actual  issues  in  governance  as  well  as  regulatory 
governance prescriptions. 
 
By means of the rate of governance, its discount rate carries out the 
task of measuring governance risk. That is to say, good governance 
rates  diminishes  the  company’s  risk  premium  to  be  attached  to  the 
investor’s expected return, whereas bad governance rates increase the 
risk premium requested by a rational investor. 
 
It seems also noticeable the fact that most companies could be rated 
with  such  index,  mainly  those  that  belong  to  countries  where  the 
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APPENDIX 1 
ON MULTIPLICATIVE AND ADDITIVE MODELS 
 
To begin with, let us set forth a multiplicative model for the expected return 
of a financial asset or portfolio denoted Ak, where the return comes explained 
by a risk-free rate and systemic risk only: 
 
1  +  E[ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ]   =  < 1 + D D D D risk-free > . < 1 + D D D D sysrisk k> 
 
that leads to the equivalent expression: 
(A1) 
 
1  +  E[ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ]   =  1 + D D D D risk-free + D D D D sysrisk k + D D D D risk-free . D D D D sysrisk k 
 
For instance, in terms of the Security Market Line
22, it would follow 
  
E 
SML [ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ]   =  D D D D risk-free + D D D D sysrisk k 
 
Or, to frame it in the streamlined fashion: 
 
E 
SML [ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ]   =  R(F) + Risk Premium . b b b b k 
 
by which (A1) would turn out to be equal to: 
 




1 + E[ [ [ [R k] ] ] ]  = 1 + E 
SML [ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ]   +  R(F) . Risk Premium . b b b b k 
 
Hence, (A2) shows the expansion of the multiplicative model as depicted by 
(A1).  
 
Now, we move on to the multiplicative model advocated by (7) in section 3:  
 
(A3) 
1  +  E[ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ]   =   < 1 + D D D D risk-free > . < 1 + D D D D counrisk > .  
 
< 1 + D D D D sysrisk k >. < 1 + D D D D nonsysrisk k > . < 1 - - - - D D D D govrisk k > 
 
In  pursuing  the  same  line  of  analysis  conveyed  in  relationships  (A1)  and 
(A2), we could shape (A3) the following way: 
 
 
                                                            
22  As  regards  SML,  Damodaran  (1995)  furnishes  with  a  suitable  expansion  for 
practitioners,  whereas  Elton  and  Gruber  (2004)  deal  with  a  more  wide-ranging 
treatment.    22 
(A4) 
1  +  E[ [ [ [ R k ] ] ] ]   =   D D D D risk-free  + D D D D counrisk  +  D D D D sysrisk k + 
 
+ D D D D nonsysrisk k  - - - - D D D D govrisk k  + multiplicative remainder 
 
From the precedent discussion we can argue that the usefulness of additive 
models seems faulty, to say the least, any time the multiplicative remainder 




AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUE 
 
An index attempts to measure the behavior of certain variable, or a set of 
them, along time. But the choice of the index relies upon the meaning we 
attach to the underlying variables. 
 
Both Gompers’ index and the one set forth in this paper provide an example 
for such linkage between the intended tool and the basic theory. 
 
a) Gompers’s index 
 
The notion of governance that feeds into this ordinal index reviewed in the 
introduction is the following: 
 
Corporate governance addresses the agency problems that are induced by 
the separation of ownership and control in modern corporation (Gompers et 
al. 2001, page 1). 
 
The  framework  of  this  definition  narrows  down  the  available  governance 
variables  to  those  strongly  related  to  agency  problems,  which  is  highly 
consistent with the final choice of provisions included in the founding charter, 
and the shaping of an ordinal index eventually. 
 
It is worthy of being remarked, on the other hand, that with such definition 
the index could run analytical trouble if we attempted to use it in non-Anglo-
Saxon  governances,  where  closed  corporation,  tightly  held  by  controlling 
families are the sum and substance in many countries. 
 
b) The weighted-average index 
 
The scope of our index is broader and more complex than the one introduced 
by Gompers et al., to the extent of choosing governance variables beyond 
those embedded  in  the  founding  charter. Exhibit  1,  in  this  paper,  throws 
light on this point, as a matter of fact. 
   23 
The definition that lays ground on this index, can be found in my paper The 
Semantics of Governance (The common thread running through corporate, 
public and global governance)
23. 
  
By Corporate Governance is meant a field of knowledge and practice within 
corporations  and  nearly  alike  organizations  (including  state-owned  firms) 
that brings to focus the following subjects: 
 
o  Ownership structure. 
o  Company’s  founding  Charter,  by-laws,  statutes,  and  codes  of  good 
practices. 
o  Board  of  Directors  and  Trustees;  allocation  of  control  and  board’s 
decision rights.  
o  Managers’  fiduciary  duties  towards  owners  and  their  management 
decision rights. 
o  Investors’ property rights and protective covenants. 
o  Conflicts  of  interest  between  managers,  creditors, owners  and  other 
stakeholders.  
o  Managers’ performance and incentives. 
o  Rent-seeking and soft-budget constraints. 
o  Production  and  disclosure  of  transparent  information  to  markets, 
regulators and stakeholders. 
o  Accountability to regulators and stakeholders. 
 
As we can see, the variables picked in Exhibit 1 stem from distinctive layers 
provided by the definition above. 
 
 
                                                            
23 Apreda, R. (2006a) The Semantics of Governance: The Common Thread Running 
Through Corporate, Public and Global Governance. Corporate Ownership and Control, 
volume 3, number 2, pp. 45-53. 